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Objective: Countries have adopted different approaches, at different times, to
reduce the transmission of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Cross-country
comparison could indicate the relative efficacy of these approaches. We assess vari-
ous nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), comparing the effects of voluntary
behavior change and of changes enforced via official regulations, by examining their
impacts on subsequent death rates.
Data Sources: Secondary data on COVID-19 deaths from 13 European countries,
over March–May 2020.
Study Design: We examine two types of NPI: the introduction of government-enforced
closure policies and self-imposed alteration of individual behaviors in the period prior to
regulations. Our proxy for the latter is Google mobility data, which captures voluntary
behavior change when disease salience is sufficiently high. The primary outcome vari-
able is the rate of change in COVID-19 fatalities per day, 16–20 days after interventions
take place. Linear multivariate regression analysis is used to evaluate impacts.
Data collection/extraction methods: publicly available.
Principal Findings: Voluntarily reduced mobility, occurring prior to government poli-
cies, decreases the percent change in deaths per day by 9.2 percentage points
(pp) (95% confidence interval [CI] 4.5–14.0 pp). Government closure policies
decrease the percent change in deaths per day by 14.0 pp (95% CI 10.8–17.2 pp).
Disaggregating government policies, the most beneficial for reducing fatality, are
intercity travel restrictions, canceling public events, requiring face masks in some sit-
uations, and closing nonessential workplaces. Other sub-components, such as closing
schools and imposing stay-at-home rules, show smaller and statistically insignificant
impacts.
Conclusions: NPIs have substantially reduced fatalities arising from COVID-19.
Importantly, the effect of voluntary behavior change is of the same order of magni-
tude as government-mandated regulations. These findings, including the substantial
variation across dimensions of closure, have implications for the optimal targeted mix
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of government policies as the pandemic waxes and wanes, especially given the eco-
nomic and human welfare consequences of strict regulations.
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What is known on this topic?
• Along with epidemiological data, analysts have tracked and published accounts of the nature,
timing, and magnitude of government-mandated nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) for
many countries.
• A substantial literature provides initial evidence on which NPIs do and which do not con-
structively affect the course of the pandemic, for example, typically international travel
restrictions appear to do so but stay-at-home orders do not as much.
• Much less analysis has addressed the extent to which voluntary behavior change also has an
important role to play in the response to the pandemic.
What this study adds?
• The pandemic in Europe led people to substantially reduce their own risky behavior, resulting
in reduction of COVID-19 mortality by an amount close to that of mandated NPIs.
• This suggests the value of government policies that enable or encourage voluntary NPIs
(e.g., provision of free masks), as opposed to mandated NPIs (e.g., strict stay-at-home orders)
which have a smaller benefit–cost ratio.
• Attributing the large adverse indirect economic consequences of the pandemic primarily to
the government response would overstate the negative impact of government policy, given
that an important component of diminished activity results from voluntary NPI.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Over the course of 1 year, the transmission of the coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) has spread to essentially every country on the
planet: as of June 2021, COVID-19 has infected hundreds of millions
of individuals and killed more than 3.5 million.1 During the first
months of the pandemic, in the absence of available effective biomed-
ical interventions like vaccines and treatments and in anticipation of
an unprecedented surge of patients in need of intensive care in hospi-
tals, a large number of national responses focused on the implementa-
tion of drastic nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), including the
closing of schools and universities, the prohibition of most commercial
business, and the legal enforcement of local lockdowns and “shelter-
in-place” orders. As a result, in May/June 2020, an estimated 1.2 bil-
lion children who should have been attending schools were not doing
so,2 with long-term consequences for learning potential and the crea-
tion of national capital, and hundreds of millions of adults have had to
cease their economic activities, with profound and immediate conse-
quences for national economies and personal livelihoods and well-
being. This is much more than a global health crisis.3
After the “first wave” of the epidemic receded in Western Europe,
countries began to retrospectively examine their NPI policies, partly to
assess when and how to reverse the school closure and movement
restriction policies that have such substantial developmental and eco-
nomic consequences, and partly to plan for subsequent epidemic waves.
The challenge, however, is that the method used to originally select the
NPIs may be less helpful for actual evaluation. In the absence of real data
or prior experience, the evidence base supporting the rollout of such
unprecedented NPIs relied on mathematical forecasting models4-9 draw-
ing on input parameters for epidemiologic quantities like severity and
attack rate, risk factors, and timing of transmission, for which empirical
validation remains nascent.10 These assumptions may have been inad-
vertently misleading, hence needing careful reassessment before being
used as the basis for future decisions. For instance, with respect to
school closures, a review of evidence from before COVID-1911 as well
as preliminary findings from Australia,12 France,13,14 and Ireland15
suggest that school children—especially at primary level—may not be
important drivers of coronavirus epidemics, in contrast to influenza, and
school closure might play a substantially smaller role than the models
had projected.
The need now is to retrospectively assess the true impact of NPIs
on COVID-related morbidity and mortality, in order to optimize their
implementation (or lack thereof) going forward, using empirical evidence.
In this respect, a number of studies have conducted retrospective ana-
lyses of the possible mitigating effects of NPIs on the COVID death toll
at the country level or comparatively across countries.8,9,16-26 In particu-
lar, using a combination of modeling approaches, Haug and colleagues21
estimated the effectiveness of NPIs on the effective reproduction num-
ber across 56 countries and 79 territories and pointed out that less dis-
ruptive NPIs might be as effective as more drastic NPIs like national
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lockdowns. Likewise, Brauner et al.20 examined 34 European and seven
non-European countries and inferred that closing all educational institu-
tions (in particular, including secondary and higher education), limiting
gatherings to 10 people or less, and closing face-to-face businesses, each
reduced transmission considerably.
In this paper, we use a time series of COVID-related mortality
data, over March–May 2020 during the first epidemic wave, from
13 comparable Western European countries to undertake a statisti-
cal examination of the timing of introduction of NPIs and their
impact on daily COVID deaths. Crucially, we include not only the
full spectrum of government-mandated regulations but also proxy
measures of voluntary behavior change before the introduction of
the government policies. Here, “voluntary” simply means in the
absence of government regulations or enforcement; the impetus
may still arise from government or other institutional sources, in
addition to peer effects (including social media) and purely self-
motivated change. This allows us to directly compare the potential
effects of naturally salient social distancing and enhanced hygiene
practices versus externally imposed and enforced regulations, with
a view to contributing to the ongoing debate regarding restrictions
on gatherings and movement; school and workplace closures; and
other dimensions of government intervention in Europe and
beyond.
2 | METHODS
We conduct a statistical analysis of the potential impact of NPIs,
either government-imposed policies or voluntary behavior changes
(before introduction of government policies), on COVID-19 deaths
over March–May 2020 among 13 Western European countries.
2.1 | COVID-19 mortality data
Daily figures for new confirmed COVID-19 deaths by country were
accessed through the European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control.27 We used data for the 13 Western European countries
with greater than 500 COVID deaths as of 16 May (Table 1), all of
which had 7–11 weeks of data, starting with date t0 which is
defined when the 5-day moving average of daily deaths is first equal
to at least five. This March–May time-period captures all of the clo-
sure policies but none of the subsequent relaxation of guidelines—
where government and voluntary impacts are more difficult to
disentangle.
COVID mortality data were used because death constitutes a sig-
nificant event; death certifications are less likely (than case notifica-
tions) to suffer from misclassifications; and the completeness of death
data is far greater than that of case notification data due to varying
testing capacity and accuracy across countries. However, (i) actual
death tolls are still likely to differ from currently reported figures due
to reporting issues, (ii) recording protocols can affect total numbers
(e.g., whether deaths in nursing care homes are included), and
(iii) reported date of death can be delayed from the actual date of
death. Issues (i) and (ii) are mitigated here by focusing on relative
changes in deaths, which also allow us to abstract away from total
population size. Issue (iii) is mitigated in part by taking a 5-day moving
average of deaths. Hence, as our dependent variable, we study the









where di,t is the daily reported number of deaths in country i on day t.
To get a sense for the behavior of this variable Δi,t, note that early
in the pandemic, the number of deaths per day is typically rising,
corresponding to the number of new infections having been growing
a few weeks earlier, which implies that Δi,t >0. Late in the pandemic,
when the number of daily deaths is declining, this percent change will
be negative. In between, each day will yield approximately the same
number of deaths, and hence, our dependent variable will be around
zero. Smaller values are always better, since they imply a slower rise
in fatalities (if positive) or a more rapid decline (if negative). Table A1
in the Supplementary appendix shows the distribution of values of
this variable in our data, week by week.
2.2 | Nonpharmaceutical intervention data
For the interventions, we focus on two broad categories:
government-imposed policies and regulations vs self-imposed and vol-
untary actions.
First, the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker
provides dates and intensities for multiple categories of government
policies across the globe.28 Here, we focus on their “containment
and closure” categories: school closing; workplace closing; canceling
public events; restricting public events and gathering sizes; closing
public transport; stay-at-home (or “shelter-in-place”) requirements;
and restrictions on internal movement and international travel. Sep-
arately, we add information on facial coverings (including formal
regulations) from their “health measures” category. We define two
alternate independent variables of the government closure measure:
(i) an easy-to-interpret binary closure measure (i.e., 0 or 1) that
occurs whenever broad stay-at-home restrictions are first promul-
gated and (ii) a continuous closure measure which is the sum of
scores across all included categories, normalized by dividing by the
maximum such score in the database. That is, each country was
given a score (0, 1, 2, 3, sometimes up to 4 or 5 depending on the
category) at each point in time, reflecting the stringency of any reg-
ulations in effect. We add those scores across all of the categories
listed above and then standardize so that the maximum possible
value is 1, in order for interpretation to be comparable to the binary
measure.
Second, we also look at self-imposed restrictions on behavior
which arose prior to the introduction of governmental interventions.
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Our primary measure, mobility decline, is based on Google's Commu-
nity Mobility Reports,29 which assess geographic mobility along dif-
ferent dimensions, as compared to a pre-crisis baseline within each
country. The aggregated anonymized data come from every mobile
device for which a user has signed in to a Google account and turned
on their “Location History” setting. We construct an independent
variable (dummy indicator) that switches from 0 to 1 in a given coun-
try when the mobility index is negative (representing activity being
below baseline levels) and remains so thereafter, for all of the follow-
ing three mobility categories: workplaces, transit stations, and retail
and recreation (see, for instance, Figure 1 which presents mobility
data for three illustrative countries, aggregated across these three
categories). We do not consider residential mobility (defined as time
spent at one's primary location) nor grocery and pharmacy activity,
since that involves essential activity. Similar changes were observed
in China early in the pandemic, where regional air pollution, indica-
tive of reduced traffic and production, decreased after cases were
reported locally but before any government restrictions had been
imposed.30
The mobility dummy indicator switches back from 1 to 0 when
the government binary closure indicator turns on in that country
because our goal is to evaluate the differential effect of unregulated
behavior change. If binary closure takes place before self-imposed
mobility decline (as in Austria and Germany), then the mobility vari-
able remains equal to 0 throughout the study period. As with closure,
we also define a continuous version of this mobility-independent vari-
able equal to the normalized sum of mobility decline across the three
relevant categories, on a given date. That is, we add up the percentage
decreases across workplace, transit, and retail/recreation and then
standardize so that the maximum value equals 1 and is comparable to
the binary measure.
2.3 | Statistical modeling approach
First of all, evidently, none of these interventions, either regulatory or
voluntary, will have an immediate effect on fatalities due to COVID-19.
Rather, we hypothesize that they will change the rate of new infections,
leading to a change in deaths some time later. In order to model that
delay, we assume that it is the sum of the incubation period, estimated
to be 5 days,5 and the period from symptom onset to death (for those
who die), which has an observed median of 13 days.31 Note that the
overall typical time to death will be different from 13 days because in a
growing epidemic, proportionately, more observations are from recent
infections (some of whom will die later). We are modeling the observed
data in the mid of a growing epidemic; hence, it is precisely the raw data
that we need to match. Thus, we assume a median lag of 18 days from
time of intervention to time of death. There is naturally some distribu-
tion for this lag, thus we employ a 5-day moving average of deaths,
corresponding to lags from 16 to 20 days (Table 1).
Figure 2 shows the 5-day average deaths for three illustrative
countries, along with the middle of the range of dates at which binary
closure and (if relevant) binary mobility decline are assumed to have
taken effect. The three countries include Spain and the United King-
dom, which both have relatively large populations, but where the local
epidemic started relatively early and relatively late respectively, as
well as Sweden, which is unique in our sample in that the government
never imposed stay-at-home regulations.
Second, we evaluate the effect of NPIs (via our two independent
variables that track government-imposed policies [Policy] vs self-
imposed behavior changes [Behavior], as defined above) on the rate of
change in COVID deaths via a linear regression model. The daily per-
centage change in deaths is our dependent variable (denoted Δi,t ), and
we use a random effects specification to further net out a range of
F IGURE 1 Change in mobility trends (February–May 2020) in Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
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country-specific factors that might affect both the total number of
deaths and local behavioral and policy changes, such as the scale of
the epidemic, political ideology, or infrastructure differences. We
employ the following model specification for the daily percentage
change in COVID deaths in country i at time t:
Δi,t ¼ αþβ1Behaviori, t18ð Þ þβ2Policyi, t18ð Þ þ γXiþθiþμ1tþμ2t2
þei,t:
ð2Þ
Behaviori, t18ð Þ and Policyi, t18ð Þ are our indicators of behavioral
and policy changes (as defined above), respectively. They are lagged
by 18 days to reflect when policy changes materialize (i.e., delayed
impact of intervention on COVID-19 deaths), as detailed above.
Meanwhile, t counts the number of days since the start of the epi-
demic in each country: this captures exogenous time trends, as well as
technological innovation and any endogenous learning by both indi-
viduals and clinicians. Because this effect is expected to be nonlinear,
we also include t2 as an independent variable. As usual, ei,t is a mean
zero exogenous error term.
Xi is a vector of time-invariant country-specific controls: share of
population older than 65,32 population density,32 the number of acute
care beds per 100,000 population,33 as well as the starting date (t0) of
the epidemic in each country (Table 1). These may each affect the sever-
ity of the outbreak independently of any interventions; however, the
main goal here is to directly compare NPIs across as similar contexts as
possible and hence to avoid any other observable confounds as much as
possible. For robustness, we also included a specification adding relevant
time-varying country-specific controls Xit : the test positivity rate and
either intensive-care or total hospital patients27 (per million).
aLastly, θi is a country-specific variable; under the random effects
model, we assume that conditional on country controls Xi ; all other
country-specific variations are distributed randomly.
In addition, in order to help interpret the implications of the
potential effect sizes of the interventions (i.e., β1 and β2 in Equa-
tion (2)), we estimated the number of days for deaths to double, as of
1 week into the epidemic, under the following three scenarios: (i) no
intervention; (ii) closure only; and (iii) voluntary behavior change only.
To do this, we fixed t = 7, predicted the expected country-average
growth rate ̂Δ t¼7ð Þ in each of the three scenarios respectively, and
applied the following formula for doubling time: τdouble ¼
ln 2ð Þ=ln 1þ ̂Δ t¼7ð Þ
  
.
Finally, we estimated the number of COVID deaths that would




F IGURE 2 Evolution of the daily deaths since t0 (the date at which the 5-day moving average reaches five deaths) in Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom
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under analogous scenarios: (i) no intervention; (ii) closure only (starting
at t = 7); and (iii) salience only (starting at t = 7). This was calculated
by summing deaths from t = 0b through t = 50, after iterating forward
using the modeled growth rates (from Equation (2)) in each of the
three hypothetical policy scenarios. Each country has slightly different
values for the time-invariant controls (such as age distribution and
population density), which lead to different predicted growth rates
above, but the primary cross-country variation in our model comes
from the local starting calendar date of the epidemic. Hence, we are
not attempting to directly compare the efficacy of policy choices
across countries; we are using the existing empirical variation to esti-
mate what various possible responses would have looked like for a
prototypical (European) country, conditional on when the pandemic
initially hit.
All statistical analyses used STATA/SE version 13.0. All data come
from publicly available aggregate sources, so no ethical approval was
required. No external funding was utilized during the course of the
study.
3 | RESULTS
Table 2 presents the main results, with Model I being the preferred spec-
ification for ease of interpretation. The first row shows that as time pas-
ses, regardless of any external intervention, death rates go down: for
each day that passes, the daily change in fatalities goes down by 0.88
(95% confidence interval: 0.67–1.10) percentage points (pp).
Both the voluntary measure (self-imposed mobility) and the clo-
sure measure (government restrictions) have substantial impacts on
death rates 18 days later. A binary reduction in self-imposed mobility
is associated with a 9.2 (4.5–14.0) pp reduction in the daily rate of
change in fatalities, while binary government restrictions are associ-
ated with a 14.0 (10.8–17.2) pp reduction. This means that if deaths
were initially growing by 5% per day, then voluntary behavior change
would cause them to start declining by 4.2% per day instead, while
government regulations would cause them to decline by 9% per day.
Models II and III estimate the same specification but with fatality
lags of 17 and 19 days, respectively (instead of a lag of 18 days in









Days from t0 0.88*** 0.86*** 0.90*** 0.83***
[1.10, 0.67] [1.06, 0.67] [1.10, 0.70] [1.05, 0.61]
Days from t0-squared 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008***
[0.006, 0.011] [0.006, 0.010] [0.006, 0.11] [0.006, 0.107]
Binary mobility 9.2*** 10.2*** 9.0***
[14.0, 4.5] [14.7, 5.7] [12.7, 5.4]
Continuous mobility 8.5*
[16.0, 1.1]
Binary closure 14.0*** 15.2*** 13.1***
[17.2, 10.8] [18.7, 11.7] [15.5, 10.7]
Continuous closure 22.1***
[27.4, 16.9]
Percent of population older than 65 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.13
[0.42, 0.06] [0.41, 0.06] [0.45, 0.10] [0.67, 0.41]
Population density 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
[0.004, 0.007] [0.004, 0.007] [0.004, 0.006] [0.010, 0.004]
Number of acute care beds, per 100 000 people 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004
[0.005, 0.009] [0.005, 0.009] [0.005, 0.008] [0.004, 0.012]
Date of t0 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.34***
[0.28, 0.14] [0.27, 0.13] [0.29, 0.13] [0.45, 0.24]
Number of observations 778 778 778 776
Note: 95% Confidence intervals are presented in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The unit of observation is a country-
day: 1 day of data for a specific country. Observed mobility is the binary measure based off Google mobility data; continuous mobility is a measure
calculated by summing the same three measures of the Google Mobility Index and normalizing across countries; binary closure is our binary variable based
on the Oxford Policy Tracker index for stay-at-home restrictions; and continuous closure is a measure calculated by summing all eight “containment and
closure” categories in the Oxford Policy Tracker and normalizing across countries. We make one small change to the Oxford data: defining the German
lockdown as being nationwide instead of regional. N is lower in Model IV because the lagged mobility data are only available for Italy from the third day of
the epidemic. Model IV assumes an average 18-day lag for mortality, like Model I.
*Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.
***Significant at 0.1% level.
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Model I, which was our best estimate from the medical literature),
confirming that the results are robust across modeling choices. Model
IV shows that the continuous measures (in place of binary measures,
both for voluntary mobility and for government restrictions) also yield
similar results. The closure measure (government restrictions) in this
case has a larger magnitude because taking on a value of 1 signifies
(as defined) that all government policies are being enacted at the max-
imal observed level simultaneously. A typical policy change is less
extreme and therefore corresponds to a proportionately reduced
impact as in Models I–III. However, the main result—that is, both vol-
untary and regulatory NPIs significantly reduce mortality, with the lat-
ter having a somewhat larger impact—carries over in any case.
The Supplementary appendix reports further sensitivity analyses:
(i) a specification of the main results with country fixed effects
(Table A2), (ii) a specification of the main results controlling for real-
time health system capacity constraints such as intensive-care
patients per capita (Table A3), (iii) an alternate proxy for voluntary
behavior change, occurring when the number of national deaths
surpasses a salience threshold of 5 (Table A4 Model II), and (iv) forced
equalization of the length of epidemic (so that each country has the
same number of days of data in the model; Table A4 Model III). Alter-
native (i) produces very similar results, but a Hausman test selects the
random effects model as the preferred primary specification. Alterna-
tive (ii) also leads to very similar results for the primary variables; the
additional controls are not significant and reduce the sample size due
to missing data for some countries. Alternative (iii) yields directionally
similar results, with smaller magnitudes for both the voluntary
(salience) and regulatory (closure) measures. This is unsurprising, since
the simple salience indicator is necessarily coarser and more ad hoc
than the mobility data. Alternative (iv) is again very similar to the pri-
mary specification, but by construction has fewer observations
(so was not preferred).
Table 3 separately reports on the effect arising from different com-
ponents when the continuous closure metric is used. Model I looks at all
eight categories individually, finding that three of them are statistically
significant. Closing nonessential workplaces is estimated to reduce the
TABLE 3 Disaggregated impact of the various nonpharmaceutical interventions on daily change in deaths, for 13 European countries, March–
May 2020
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
School closure 2.9 3.3 2.5 22.1***
[6.4, 0.62] [7.0, 0.5] [6.1, 1.1]
Workplace closure 4.0* 4.1* 4.0
[7.4, 0.5] [7.6, 0.5] [8.9, 0.9]
Restricting events 5.9** 2.2 13.0***
[9.8, 2.0]
Restricting gathering size 3.1** [7.6, 3.2]
[1.0, 5.2]
Closure of public transport 2.5 9.5*
[1.7, 6.6] [27.4, 16.9]
Stay-at-home restrictions 3.7 [20.0, 6.1]
[11.8, 4.4]
Restrictions on internal travel 2.5 [16.9, 2.2]
[7.3, 2.2]
Restrictions on international travel 5.4*
[9.6, 1.1]
Face mask requirements 6.8** 4.0* 4.1*
[11.3, 2.2] [7.8, 0.3] [7.6, 0.62]
Continuous mobility 7.5 8.8* 10.0* 8.5*
[15.7, 0.62] [16.1, 1.4] [17.9, 2.1] [15.9, 1.1]
Number of observations 776 776 776 776
Note: 95% Confidence intervals are presented in square brackets. Specifications also included controls for t, t-squared, the percentage of population older
than 65, the population density, and number of acute care beds per 100,000 people, and the date when the 5-day moving average of daily deaths is first
equal to at least five. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The unit of observation is a country-day: 1 day of data for a specific country. All
indicators of government restrictions are as defined in the Oxford tracker and are normalized across an interval [0,1] for the 13 countries. N lower than in
Models I–III in Table 2 because the lagged mobility data are only available for Italy from the third day of the epidemic.
*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
***Significant at 0.1% level.
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change in deaths by 4.0 (0.5–7.4) pp; restricting public events reduces it
by 5.9 (2.0–9.8) pp; limiting international travel reduces it by 5.4
(1.1–9.6) pp; and requiring face masks in some public situations reduces
it by 6.8 (2.2–11.3) pp. Subsequent columns combine qualitatively simi-
lar categories to estimate the effect of the corresponding policies, as
well as to check for sensitivity to the particular definitions used in the
country tracker data. Overall everything is robust, with the possible
exception of limiting public events (which no longer appears effective
when combined with restrictions on the size of gatherings).
Furthermore, we use the coefficients in Model I (see Table 2) to
estimate the number of days for deaths to double, as of t = 7, under
three scenarios: (i) no intervention, (ii) closure only, and (iii) voluntary
mobility reduction only. Doubling time is increased from 3.0 (2.7–3.4)
to 4.5 (3.7–5.8) days with a voluntary reduction in mobility (salience
scenario), or to 6.1 (5.0–8.1) days with government lockdown.
Finally, we compare our estimated projections of the number of
deaths under scenarios (i), (ii), and (iii), compared with observations (since
the epidemic start) from exemplar countries. For example, Spain would
have had 174,935 deaths over the first 50 days of the epidemic if there
had been no interventions at all, while in reality, 23,467 deaths were
observed over that same period. Yet, if Spain had closed down 2 weeks
earlier, deaths would have been only 3487. Furthermore, even with
purely self-imposed changes throughout, as long as those began equally
early, the number of deaths would have been only 11,430. Thus, the
timing of interventions is crucial: tens of thousands of lives could have
been saved even without a full lockdown. Meanwhile, Sweden experi-
enced a later epidemic start and, in the absence of any interventions,
would have seen an estimated 53,528 deaths in its first 50 days. Rather,
3271 deaths were reported in Sweden over the same time period-similar
to our projection for scenario (iii) of voluntary changes only (since that
was indeed what happened there, although the timing was slightly differ-
ent)—while government closure could have reduced this further to 1494.
4 | DISCUSSION
Using daily death count data from 13 European countries over
March–May 2020, we find that NPIs could substantially reduce fatali-
ties from COVID-19. Both voluntary behavior change prior to official
government guidelines, as well as strict government regulations them-
selves, had a significant effect on the evolution of the rate of change
of deaths. The magnitudes of the two approaches were not markedly
different from one another: government closures reduced the rate of
change of deaths by around 14 pp, while behavior change (in the
absence of government regulations) reduced it by around 9 pp. Either
approach, if in place realistically early, would have saved thousands of
lives in a typical country in our sample.
A number of previous observational analyses of NPIs, including
primarily stay-at-home, social distancing directives, closing of educa-
tional institutions, closing of businesses, and limiting gatherings, have
focused on estimating impact on cases and reproduction numbers,
either in individual countries24,34-39 or across multiple coun-
tries.20-23,26,40,41 There is limited existing work regarding the effect
specifically of stay-at-home policies and government interventions on
deaths, for example, in Brazil,42 France,16 Sweden,17 the United
States,18 and across countries.19 Similar to our paper, Flaxman et al.8
examined the impact of regulations on fatalities in 11 European coun-
tries. They assessed multiple government interventions (including
explicit encouragement of social distancing) but did not consider vol-
untary behavior change as here. Their main result was that lockdowns
had a strong impact, but surprisingly that no other policies (social dis-
tancing, limiting public events, closing schools, or self-isolation) had a
significant effect at all. Our conclusions are distinct, perhaps due to
the fact that we take a naïve but direct statistical approach to the rela-
tionships rather than filtering them through a complex structural
mathematical model.
Another publication41 studied the impact of multiple interven-
tions on cases (not deaths) across six countries globally, using a similar
reduced-form approach to that taken here. However, like the other
studies, it does not consider voluntary changes, so its counterfactual
scenario (exponential growth of 38% per day in the absence of policy)
becomes less and less realistic over time, exaggerating the role of
explicit policies in flattening the curve. Lastly, Haug et al.21 modeled
intervention impact on the effective reproduction number across
56 countries and showed that less disruptive interventions might be
as effective compared to drastic ones (i.e., lockdowns). Brauner
et al.,20 in analyzing 34 countries, concluded that closing all educa-
tional institutions, limiting gatherings, and closing businesses each
substantially reduced COVID-19 transmission.
To our knowledge, only a handful of previous studies, particularly
in the context of the United States,25,39,43-45 have explored the
remarkable impact of self-imposed behavior change, also via mobility
data, yet these empirical results suggest that enforced lockdown regu-
lations offer only modestly stronger epidemiological outcomes than
well-timed voluntary behavior change. This is an important observa-
tion in the context of addressing future spikes or epidemics in other
countries, especially given that self-motivated behaviors (e.g., social
distancing, improved personal hygiene, reducing unnecessary travel,
and working remotely when possible) are intrinsically less disruptive
and more individually malleable than regulatory options (e.g., shelter-
in-place orders, closing schools, and banning public transit). Although
we did not include the United States in our analysis, since our goal
was to isolate the impacts of NPIs per se (rather than cross-country
comparisons), there is no reason to believe that the relative qualitative
conclusions comparing interventions would not carry over, even if the
magnitudes are not the same.
Our results also provide insights into which of the government
regulations were more effective when we disaggregate government
policies into various subcategories. Limiting travel, particularly interna-
tional travel, seems to have a significant effect, as does closure of
nonessential workplaces. However other categories, including closing
schools and imposing stay-at-home rules, show smaller and statisti-
cally insignificant effects. These subcategory findings are to be inter-
preted with caution, in part because there is less variation than
optimal across countries in our sample, but they do suggest that policy
makers should think carefully about whether—and if so for how long—
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the various restrictions, some of which are known to inflict large costs
on health, education, welfare, and the economy, are necessary.
As one of a few studies to explore these issues empirically using
substantial data, our analysis inevitably involves a number of limita-
tions. Without randomization or other exogenous variation in the
treatments, evidently, we cannot fully ascertain a causal link between
the NPIs and the resulting changes in death rates. We do not expect
any direct reverse causality, since future deaths will not change cur-
rent behaviors. Current case rates could impact both variables,
although as long as that effect is similar across dimensions it will not
change the relative performance between voluntary versus govern-
ment NPIs, or within the latter, which is our main outcome of interest.
It is conceivable that some third variable, for instance, heightened
media attention and scrutiny, could directly influence both govern-
ment policies and individual behaviors. Future studies, using data on
this and similar potential confounders, may be able to fully disentangle
the various mechanisms at play.
Beyond endogeneity concerns, the quality of the fatality data
may be subject to variation in reporting standards across countries,
although this will be mitigated for the most part by focusing on rates
of change rather than levels. Similarly, the quality of the government
closure data is, although compiled independently without any appar-
ent bias, somewhat subjective in nature as to the precise degree of
severity in each category at each point in time. Meanwhile the mobil-
ity data, while more objective, does not capture the full range of vol-
untary self-protective behaviors (such as hand washing and
maintaining personal distance). Our supposition is that these are all
highly correlated with one another, but if this relationship differs sub-
stantially over time, then it could fail to be a good proxy for overall
voluntary changes; it is not a priori clear in which direction this would
affect the current results.
Our main messages are that NPIs can have significant impacts in
reducing COVID-19 mortality and that almost half of this effect arises
from simpler and more flexible voluntary interventions such as micro-
level behavioral change, working remotely to the extent possible, and
reducing discretionary travel, as opposed to stricter officially imposed
regulations. Precisely, why that is we cannot say from our analysis—
other research has examined, for example, sociodemographic differ-
ences46—but the distinction is clearly important to countries at any
stage of responding to the pandemic. Indeed this was suggested in a
paper as early as March 2020: “Personal, rather than government action,
in western democracies might be the most important issue.”47 These
lessons are relevant around the globe, although cost-effective targeting
and evidence-based policy are likely even more important for resource-
constrained countries with a weaker health and financial safety net.
ENDNOTES
a We thank a reviewer for suggesting this.
b Recall t0 is defined when the 5-day moving average of daily deaths is
first equal to at least 5; for this counterfactual analysis, we normalized all
countries to start at exactly 5 so that small changes in initial conditions
(driven solely by the discrete nature of the threshold) would not arbi-
trarily affect the results.
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